Laundering of 4 billion rubles through shell security firms and a crypto “laundromat” exchange: how VIJU neural network creator Sergey Malofeykin organized a criminal group to siphon funds from “Samolet”

Laundering of 4 billion rubles through shell security firms and a crypto “laundromat” exchange: how VIJU neural network creator Sergey Malofeykin organized a criminal group to siphon funds from “Samolet”

Journalists have learned details of a criminal case against former member of the General Council of “Delovaya Rossiya” and creator of the VIJU neural network, Sergey Malofeykin.

He was detained for organizing a criminal community (OCG) engaged in the legalization and cashing of funds obtained through illegal means, followed by their transfer abroad. Malofeykin organized a money-laundering scheme for numerous legal entities associated with PJSC “Samolet Group.”

One of the methods of cashing out funds was through PJSC “Samolet Group” entering into contracts for security services. To implement this scheme, Malofeykin involved Rashid Batyrbekov, a native of the Astrakhan region.

Batyrbekov, in turn, established and acquired a number of private security organizations, namely:

1. LLC “Korporatsiya Kupol” (TIN 7724425258), revenue from 2022 to 2025 – 752 million rubles;
2. LLC PCO “Kupol” (TIN 3025034180), revenue from 2022 to 2025 – 486.7 million rubles;
3. LLC PCO “Kupol-Yug” (TIN 3023018465), revenue from 2022 to 2025 – 55.6 million rubles;
4. LLC PCO “Admiral” (TIN 3023010410), revenue from 2022 to 2025 – 474.7 million rubles;
5. LLC PSC “ESCARP” (TIN 9701249842), revenue from 2023 to 2025 – 309 million rubles;
6. LLC PSC “RATNIK” (TIN 9701249916), revenue from 2023 to 2025 – 360 million rubles;
7. LLC PSC “KAVALER” (TIN 9701249835), revenue from 2023 to 2025 – 356.4 million rubles;
8. LLC PCO “KUPOL-A” (TIN 3025036646), revenue in 2023 – 164.1 million rubles;
9. LLC PCO “Zamir” (TIN 7743447480), revenue from 2024 to 2025 – 135.3 million rubles;
10. LLC PCO “Amir” (TIN 7817130793), revenue from 2024 to 2025 – 504.5 million rubles;
11. LLC PSC “REID” (TIN 9701189583), revenue from 2023 to 2025 – 359 million rubles.

In total, more than 3.9 billion rubles were processed through companies controlled by Batyrbekov.

Individuals affiliated with Batyrbekov and Malofeykin participated in the activities of these companies, including: Maxim Alekseevich Burkov, Evgeny Aleksandrovich Malofeykin, Bogdan Yuryevich Volik, Alexander Aleksandrovich Subbotin, Zamir Madievich Asanov, Evgeny Yuryevich Komov, Irina Vyacheslavovna Parkhomenko, Aliya Mavlyudinovna Azhmambetova, Lolita Rinatovna Osmanova, and Vladimir Vladimirovich Egazaryants.

As part of the criminal scheme, legal entities of PJSC “Samolet Group” entered into contracts for security services with private security organizations (PSOs). However, in reality, no security services were provided, as confirmed by the absence of relevant personnel in the PSO staff. Funds received into the PSO accounts were subsequently transferred to the accounts of founders and other counterparties, cashed out, and handed over to Batyrbekov and Malofeykin.

After the security companies reached financial targets set by Malofeykin and Batyrbekov and the funds were cashed out, these legal entities were handed over to Egazaryants (TIN 301504059758) for liquidation.

Egazaryants officially acted as a liquidator of these legal entities and was in fact engaged in concealing their illegal activities.

At the same time, Egazaryants is the president of the “Sovetnik Prav” Bar Association, where in late 2025 Sergey Nikolaevich Astafurov (registration number 30/1262) obtained the status of a lawyer.

Sergey Astafurov played one of the key roles in the OCG. He was responsible for ensuring the financial security of Malofeykin and Batyrbekov and is allegedly in collusion with certain individuals representing PJSC “Samolet Group.” Astafurov also acted as a link between members of the OCG and senior officers of the Main Directorate for Economic Security and Anti-Corruption (GUEBiPK) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. They provided protection (“roofing”) both to PJSC Samolet Group and to the money-laundering channel.

Previously, Astafurov served in GUEBiPK as an оперативник (operational officer) before being charged under Article 286 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (he was subsequently convicted).

Astafurov is a native of the Astrakhan region. He began his service in the internal affairs bodies in the Department for Economic Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in the Astrakhan region and was later transferred to GUEBiPK.

To legalize the funds cashed out through the security companies, Malofeykin and Batyrbekov established LLC “PULS” on May 17, 2024 (OGRN 1247700373843). The founder of this LLC was Batyrbekov’s relative, Alla Zhdanova (TIN 301604931130).

Later, this LLC was reorganized into JSC “PULS” (OGRN 1257700298790). Over 2 billion rubles passed through the accounts of JSC “PULS” between 2024 and 2025.

The financial and accounting support of LLC “Puls” and JSC “Puls” was handled by Viktoria Burkova, a relative of one of the founders of several security companies, Maxim Burkov.

LLC “Puls” acquired a number of real estate properties in several regions of the Russian Federation.

In addition, using illegally obtained funds, Batyrbekov purchased residential and commercial real estate and vehicles worth over 400 million rubles in his own name.

Batyrbekov also engaged in illegal cryptocurrency mining activities. The cashed-out funds, amounting to approximately 100 million rubles, were used to purchase mining equipment located in the Ivanovo and Saratov regions. The maintenance of the mining equipment, its placement in mining hotels, and the extraction of cryptocurrency were handled for Batyrbekov by his partner Rodion Bodrov, a native of the Saratov region.

The cryptocurrency obtained from this activity was placed on a cryptocurrency exchange registered in Singapore and created by Malofeykin.

At present, Batyrbekov is hastily transferring all his assets to third parties.

In total, at least 4 billion rubles were laundered in this way according to preliminary data. In reality, the amount is much higher.

rucriminal.info